The Republic of Korea-second structural adjustment loan by The World Bank
Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No. 20486-KO
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
Loan No. 43990-KO
May 25, 2000
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their
official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(as of May 25, 2000)
Currency Unit = Won (W)
US$1.00 = W1,127
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADB - Asian Development Bank
BIS - Bank for International Settlements
BOK - Bank of Korea
CAS - Country Assistance Strategy
Chaebol - Conglomerate
CFSRL - Corp. & Fin. Sector Restructuring Loan
ERL - Economic Reconstruction Loan
FSC - Financial Supervisory Commission
FSS - Financial Supervisory Service
FTA - Fair Trade Act
G-7 - Group of seven industrial countries including: the U.S., U.K., Canada,
Germany, France, Italy and Japan
GOK - Government of Korea
ICR - Implementation Completion Report
IMF - International Monetary Fund
KAMCO - Korean Asset Management Corporation
KDIC - Korean Deposit Insurance Corporation
KFTC - Korean Fair Trade Commission
LIBOR - London Inter-Bank Offer Rate
MOFE - Ministry of Finance and Economy
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
NPL - Non-Performing Loan
SAL - Structural Adjustment Loan
SBA - Stand-By Arrangement
SFO - Special Financial Operations
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
Vice President Jemal-ud-din Kassum, EAPVP
Country Director Sri-Ram Aiyer, EACKF
Sector Director Homi Kharas, EASPR
Task Manager Zia Qureshi, EACKQ
FOR OMCLAL USE ONLY
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
Loan No. 43990-KO
CONTENTS
Preface ......................... i
1. Project Data .1
2. Principal Performance Ratings .1
3. Assessment of Development Objectives and Design, and of Quality at Entry . 2
4. Achievement of Objectives and Outputs .2
5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome .8
6. Sustainability .9
7. Bank and Borrower Performance .0
8. Lessons Learned .12
9. Partner Comments .14
10. Additional Information ........................ 15
Table 1: Key Economic Indicators ........................ 3
Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix
Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing
Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits
Annex 4. Bank Inputs
Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components
Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance
Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents
Annex 8. Structural Adjustment Loan II - Letter of Development Policy and Policy Matrix
This document has a reslicted distnbution aid may be used by recipients only in the
performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without
World Bank aithorization.

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
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Loan No. 43990-KO
Preface
The Second Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL II) to the Republic of Korea in the amount of
US$2 billion was approved on October 22, 1998. The loan was made effective and the first tranche
of $1 billion disbursed on October 23, 1998. The second tranche of $1 billion was disbursed on
May 11, 1999. The loan closed on June 30, 1999, which was the original closing date.
SAL II was the third in a series of World Bank adjustment loans in support of the major
structural reform program that the Government of Korea launched in response to the economic
crisis. It built on the reforms initiated under an Economic Reconstruction Loan (ERL) approved on
December 23, 1997, and continued under a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I) approved on
March 26, 1998.
The primary author of this Implementation Completion Report (ICR) was Richard Carroll.
Zia Qureshi was the Task Manager and supervised the preparation of the ICR. The report is based
on interviews with the task team and the concerned managers and materials from the project file.

Project ID: KR-PE-5652 1 Project Name: Structural Adjustment Loan II
Team Leader: Zia Qureshi TL Unit: EACKQ
ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date:51251100
1. Project Data
Name: Structural Adjustnent Loan II L/C Number. 43990
Country/Department: Korea Region: East Asia
Sector/subsector: PREM
KEY DATES
Original Revised/Actual
PCD: June 29, 1998 Effective: October 23, 1998
Appraisal: August 31, 1998 MTR. NA
Approval: October 22, 1998 Closing: June 30, 1999
Borrower/lImplementing Agency: Ministry of Finance and Economy
Other Partners:
STAFF Current At Appraisal
Vice President: Jemal-ud-din Kassum Jean-Michel Severino
Country Manager: Sri-Ram Aiyer Sri-Ram Aiyer
Sector Manager: Homi Kharas Masahiro Kawai
Team Leader at ICR: Zia Qureshi Zia Qureshi
ICR Primary Author: Richard J. Carroll NA
2. Principal Performance Ratings
(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly
Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)
Outcome: S
Sustainability: L
Institutional Development Impact: S
Bank Performance: S
Borrower Performance: S
QAG (if available) ICR
Quality at Entry: S S
Project at Risk at Any Time: M M
3 Assessment of Development Objectives and Design, and of Quality at Entry
3.1 Original Objective
The objectives of the loan were fundamental and far reaching, yet designed for a fast disbursing
loan that would deliver BOP assistance in a timely fashion. Thc overall objective was to help Korea
restore financial stability while mitigating the social costs of adjustment and implementing deep
structural reforms in the financial and corporate sectors to pave the way for Korea's return to strong
and sustained growth.
3.2 Revised Objective
No revisions
3.3 Original Components
SAL II can be distinguished from the previous two operations in that it was implemented over a
longer period (2 vs. 1 tranches) and was a deeper and broader operation. The first loan, ERL, was
an emergency liquidity transfer that established the broad frarmework for the rest of the program.
SAL I had more detailed conditionality, but also addressed the urgent need to restore market
confidence in Korea's economy. SAL II was considerably broader and went much deeper into the
elements of medium and long-term economic reform. The components of SAL II were:
I. Macroeconomic Framework
II. Financial Sector Reform
III. Corporate Sector Reform
A. Corporate Financial Restructuring
B. Corporate Governance, Competition Policies, and Reform and Privatization of
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
IV. Labor Market and Social Safety Nets
3.4 Revised Components
No revisions
3.5 Quality at Entry
The QAG assessment of SAL II was satisfactory overall. The QAG assessment noted that although
no economic and sector work on Korea had been done by the Bank for some years following
Korea's graduation from Bank borrowing, the Bank mad.e effective use of staff who had substantial
knowledge of the politics and economy of Korea. SAL II was also nominated by the EAP Region
for a 1999 Award for Excellence.
4. Achievement of Objectives and Outputs
4.1 Outcome/Achievement of Objectives
The SAL II program and its achievements were impressive. The fulfillment of SAL II program
conditions constituted a response that was rapid and comprehensive. Confidence of the
international financial community was restored quickly. The main short-term impact was not only
in averting a possible secondary crisis, but also in supporting economic recovery at a rate far ahead
of market expectations, with GDP growth in 1999 reaching 10.7 percent. From a longer-term
perspective, the deep reforrns supported by SAL II addressed key structural and institutional
deficiencies that underlay Korea's vulnerability to crisis. These reforms helped lay the foundation
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for Korea's return to strong and sustained growth and strengthened its ability to withstand fuiture
shocks. Given the medium- to long-term nature of fundamental structural and institutional reform,
Korea will need to continue its reform program in order to reposition its economy for sustained
growth in the context of today's more globalized and competitive world economy. With the
substantial progress made on structural reform under the SAL program, a good basis has been laid
for Korea to build on. Overall, the breadth, depth and pace of structural reforms implemented by
Korea compared favorably with those of other East Asian crisis countries.
Macroeconomic Framework
Macroeconomic indicators rebounded much faster than expected, especially growth. When the
exchange rate stabilized in March 1998, the main macroeconomic issue became the recession. With
that came a loosening of the Fund position on the fiscal deficit for which the Bank had been
arguing, and an increase of social safety net programs. The focus on the recession was well-placed
because the drop in domestic consumption and investment was far greater than predicted. The lack
of confidence in the economy and a desire to conserve resources by hoarding money had to be
halted. Because the banks were restructuring, credit was very tight. SMEs had almost no source of
additional capital. By the end of the program, credit growth had resumed.
Table 1: Key Econonic Indicators
-Real GDP growth - % change 6.8 5.0 -6.7 10.7 8.0
.GCross domestic inv.-% of GDP 37.9 34.2 21.2 26.8 30.0
G ross national saving.-% of GDP 33.5 32.5 34.0 33.0 32.0
CPI Inflation-end-period % change 4.9 6.6 4.0 1.4 1.8
Govt. budget balance - % of GDP 0.0 -1.7 -4.3 -3.5 -3.0
M3 growth - % change 16.7 13.9 12.5 8.0 ...
3-year corp. bond yield - end-period 12.6 24.4 8.0 10.0 ...
Balance of Payments-US$ billion
Exports, f.o.b. 130.0 138.6 132.1 145.5 166.0
Imports, f.o.b. -144.9 -141.8 -90.5 -116.8 -152.9
Current Acct. Balance -23.0 -8.2 40.7 25.0 9.5
Usable reserves 29.4 9.1 48.5 74.1 95.0
External Debt-Total-US$ billion 164.3 158.1 148.7 136.0 129.6
of which short-term 93.0 63.6 30.7 35.0 36.0
External Debt-% of GDP 31.6 33.2 46.9 33.4 26.8
Source: Govt. of Korea, and World Bank/IMF staff estimates.
Despite the fiscal costs of fighting the recession and the Government-financed restructuring of the
financial sector, total public debt as a percentage of GDP is expected to be around 30 percent in the
year 2000, far lower than the OECD average. Until the end of 1999 the main concerns were the
increase in unemployment, the fall of real wages, and the credit crunch. Unemployment peaked at
8.6 percent in February 1999.
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Growth became positive in the first quarter of 1999. The real exchange rate maintained Korea's
competitive position. In 1999, consumer confidence returned and the stock market recovered far
ahead of the pre-crisis level.
Given the progress in restoring stability and achieving economic recovery, the macroeconomic
component of the program is rated highly satisfactory.
Financial Sector Reform
Financial sector reform was a central component of the reform program. Its main short-term impact
was the restoration of market confidence as shown by the upgrade of Korea to investment grade
prior to compliance with second tranche conditions. For the longer term, SAL II supported
fundamental restructuring of the sector. There were several important elements to the financial
sector reform component. Overall, progress on this component is rated satisfactory. At the same
time, given that a sizable part of the agenda for sector restructuring remains unfinished, it will be
important for the Government to sustain the momentum of refonrn.
* Restoration of solvency of banking system. All banks had met or had concrete plans to meet
the 8 percent threshold for capital adequacy by the release of the second tranche. All banks,
except for two small banks, had complied by end of 1999. Significant steps were taken toward
the privatization of Korea First Bank, one of the largest banks in Korea, and a majority stake in
the bank was sold to a consortium led by Newbridge Capital in late 1999, affirming the
Govermment's resolve to bring foreign capital and expertise into the Korean banking system and
increasing competition. KAMCO purchases of nonperforming assets and KDIC equity
injections to help institutions recapitalize were critical to the recovery of the sector. They were
funded by GOK's allocation of 64 trillion Won for KAMCO and KDIC for asset purchases and
recapitalization purposes.
* Strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory functions. FSC and FSS (the operational
arm of FSC) provided the organizational structure and TA helped the FSS strengthen its
capacity to supervise financial institutions and monitor progress in restructuring and
recapitalization. In the newly established FSS, the supervision of the entire financial sector was
consolidated in a single agency. Prudential regulations relating to capital adequacy, loan
classification and provisioning, and large exposures and connected lending were considerably
strengthened.
* Capital market development. The program lays the groundwork for developing equity and
bond markets to facilitate a shift in corporate finances away :from an excessive reliance on bank
debt. The measures taken aimed at strengthening the regulatory and institutional framework -
underpinning the capital market. An action plan to develop bond markets was initiated. In
addition, mutual funds and asset-backed securities are now allowed.
Corporate Sector Reform
Corporate Financial Restructuring. This component had fDur key targets: (i) improve the
insolvency regime; (ii) concentrate on restructuring the Top 5 chaebols; (iii) develop a corporate
workout system for the other chaebols; and (iv) assist with restructuring of small and medium
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enterprises. Progress in the insolvency regime was good, with 90 companies undergoing the
insolvency process and with the enforcement of rules that make it more difficult for companies to
avoid restructuring. In the latter case, for example, the timetable for court decisions on whether to
pursue insolvency was shortened from 5 months to 1 month. Building on SAL I, further
improvements were made in insolvency laws and the institutional capacity of the insolvency
system.
The Top 5 conglomerates were addressed separately because of their large share of the Korean
economy and their political connections. These Top 5 chaebols reached agreement with their lead
banks on their capital structure improvement plans (CSIPs). Cross guarantees were on track for
elimination by March 2000. The CSIPs helped achieve a reduction in the average debt-equity ratio
of the Top 5 from 400 percent or higher at the beginning of the crisis to below 200 percent by the
end of 1999, except for the Daewoo group which was unable to meet its debt obligations and was
forced into restructuring through formal workouts of its major affiliates. In the mid-tier firms,
workouts were agreed for about 90 companies, about half of them belonging to chaebols ranked 6-
64. For SMEs that had simply continued to roll over their debts, banks created workout programs.
The Bank Corporate Financial Restructuring TA loan helped the lead banks develop workout and
turnaround capacity.
The FSC supervised an ambitious restructuring plan which set up out-of-court workout programs
for distressed companies in the 6-64 chaebol group and other medium to large firms. Workouts
were negotiated under the Corporate Restructuring Agreement (CRA), which was signed by 210
bank and non-bank financial institutions in July 1998. The CRA provides a framework of rules and
timetable and lays out roles in inter-creditor resolution. Fifty five non-viable affiliates of chaebols,
20 of which were from the Top 5, were identified for mandated exits. Of these 20, there were 7
liquidations, 6 sales and 7 mergers.
Corporate Governance. Corporate governance had two major subcomponents: (i) strengthening
shareholders' rights and boards of directors and (ii) improving the accounting and auditing practices
in banks and corporations. SAL II witnessed substantial progress in achieving transparency in the
previously opaque business practices in Korea. This change represented a radical shift in culture in
the corporate sector and in the Government bureaucracy. Secrecy was power for a select few who,
by keeping financial records secret, could turn their modest holdings into a controlling interest of a
large chaebol. One of the main impacts of the corporate governance component was to begin to
undo the ability of shareholders to effectively control companies with a stake of no more than 10
percent, thanks to weaknesses in the regime of governing corporate boards and minority shareholder
rights. It was this ability, combined with the lack of transparency, that allowed exploitative
practices such as anti-competitive transfers and transactions between chaebol affiliates.
Shareholders' rights. Improving minority shareholders' rights and strengthening the functions and
independence of corporate boards aimed at reforming insular boards which ran companies like
family businesses. The goal was to shift corporate emphasis from meeting the interests of the
controlling shareholder to that of maximizing shareholder value. One verifiable indicator toward
that goal was that by SAL II, at least 25 percent of board members were outside directors (this
requirement was increased to 50 percent for large corporations). Another was the reduction of
thresholds for various minority shareholder actions that was continued from SAL I.
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Financial transparency and accountability reforms. There were several major accomplishments
that fell under a two-pronged strategy of measures that would produce immediate results, such as
adopting international accounting and auditing standards (that will be applied for all financial
statements and audits for companies with assets in excess of W7 billion beginning with the financial
year 1999), and institutional changes for the longer run, such as the strengthening of the Korea
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (KICPA) and the audit committees of boards of directors
and establishment of an independent accounting standard setting board. The general goal of
reducing the role of government in accounting and auditing was accomplished. The KICPA was
strengthened to oversee the accounting and auditing profession. The Korea Accounting Standards
Board, a privately initiated organization, is now responsible for setting accounting standards. The
expected impact of a rise in disciplinary actions against accountants for inadequate performance of
duty did occur, with the expectation that disciplinary actions will subside as the profession
continues to assimilate best practices. Large listed companies and all banks are now required to
have audit committees of boards of directors and a majority of directors on the committee from
outside of the company, two critical measures to achieve transparency. Creating the audit
committee, which required amending the Commercial Code, ensures that a quality audit will be
done. All companies must comply with the audit requirement by March 31, 2000.
The full impact of these fundamental changes in business culture and practices will take several
years to materialize. However, the changes achieved under SAL tI have laid the groundwork for
greater transparency and efficiency in the corporate sector over the longer term. The legal and
regulatory environment for corporate governance was substantially improved and transformed
toward international best practice. The strong recovery of the stock market in 1999 may in part
have been indicative of the positive investor response to the corporate governance improvements.
The surge in foreign direct investment also indicates a positive impact of the reforms.
Competition Policies. The major accomplishment and impact of the competition policies
component were the several major laws that were passed and the strengthening of the Korean Fair
Trade Commission (KFTC).
* Fair Trade Act (FTA). Amendments to the FTA strengthened its competition provisions,
allowed the establishment of holding companies under certain restrictions, and helped the KFTC
deal more effectively with mergers and acquisitions, which were important to corporate
restructuring.
* Foreign investment promotion act (FIPA). The FIPA was an important achievement in
liberalizing foreign investment and partly contributed to the stock market rebound. It was also
an important move to win confidence of international portfolio managers. Foreign direct
investment totaled $8.9 billion in 1998 and $15.5 billion in 1999, sharply up from an average of
about $2 billion in the three years prior to the crisis. Overall, the opening of the foreign
investment regime supported by the SALs was radical.
* Deregulation and the Act on Comprehensive Regulation of Cartels. The Act attempted to
eliminate monopolies in some industries. The act will take on greater significance when the
legislative framework is developed further to accommodate the privatization of monopolies. In
addition, the Deregulation Committee helped eliminate or modify 7,000 of 11,000 regulations
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that had been identified for review in order to improve the environment for domestic and foreign
investment.
* KFTC strengthening. Strong capacity building for KFTC linked with best practices was
important because one of the major challenges faced by KFTC was the chaebols' resistance to
restructuring. The legislative improvements enhanced KFTC's mandate to review the Big Deals
(swaps among Top 5 chaebol affiliates), though it continued to face political constraints in
effectively dealing with them. KFTC increased its enforcement power through the ability to
levy fines, which reached $138 million equivalent by the end of SAL II, a result aided by
KFTC's power to obtain corporate financial records. KFTC also significantly improved its
capacity to assess mergers, as well as to identify price fixing and unfair trade practices. KFTC
also began to be effective in enforcing the ban on the anti-competitive practice of cross holdings
in which a subsidiary of a conglomerate would give an unfair advantage to another of its
subsidiaries, for example, by selling it inputs at below market prices.
Reform and Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises. GOK embarked on a strong program to
reform and privatize state-owned enterprises and increase private participation in infrastructure
sectors. The key components of this program were to improve the management structure of SOEs,
identify SOEs to be offered for sale along with a schedule for executing those sales, design a
strategy to develop the institutional and regulatory framework needed for privatization and SOE
reform, and undertake studies in specific infrastructure sectors (telecommunications, power, and
gas) to establish regulatory entities and pricing mechanisms.
Overall, the corporate sector reform component is rated satisfactory. But, as in the case of the
financial sector, the agenda for corporate sector restructuring is medium term in nature and will
require continuation of reform efforts well beyond the period of SAL 1I.
Labor Market and Social Safety Nets
The program included a comprehensive package of social sector measures, both to mitigate the
short-term impact of the crisis on the poor and unemployed and to initiate longer term reform of
Korea's system of social protection. The macro indicators pointed to strong success in the social
component. The urban poverty rate had been 8.5 percent in the third quarter of 1997, jumped to an
estimated peak of 23 percent in the third quarter of 1998 and has since improved to around 13
percent. Unemployment, below 3 percent before the crisis, peaked at 8.6 percent in February 1999
and fell to an average of 4.6 percent in the last quarter of 1999. By April 2000, the unemployment
rate had declined further to 4.1 percent. Overall, the labor markets and social safety nets component
is rated satisfactory.
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Labor markets. A major step taken under SAL I to enhance labor market flexibility was the
legalization of layoffs. SAL II supported the full enforcement of the layoff provisions. Further
improvements in labor market flexibility were achieved through easing restrictions on the use of
contract labor and on manpower leasing. While progress was eventually made on easing
restrictions on manpower leasing, political factors delayed action on this measure which required a
waiver of the related tranche release condition.
Social Protection. Unemployment insurance coverage was substantially expanded to include
unemployed workers of all firms. Envisaged budget increases for public works programs, means-
tested, non-contributory income support, and workfare were achieved, resulting in a doubling of
social expenditures. The targeting of the social protection programs was improved.
For the longer run, groundwork was laid for major reform of the pension system and health
insurance, aimed at improving their equity, efficiency and financial sustainability. The overarching
accomplishment supported by SAL II was to establish a reform process for achieving a modem
welfare state as opposed to imposing any specific outcome. As the welfare components evolved
within a Korean context, the Bank provided technical assistance to make it work. Pension fund
management, anti-poverty programs, etc., were supported by ASEM grants (approximately $lm to
each). The TA was valuable in exposing officials to international best practices and raising
standards to OECD levels (of which Korea is a member).
4.2 Net present Value/Economic Rate of Return
Not applicable
4.3 Financial Rate of Return
Not applicable
4.4 Institutional Development Impact
SAL II supported broader and deeper institutional development that was initiated under the previous
operations (ERL and SAL I). This institutional development, including an enhanced financial
regulatory and supervisory regime, improved corporate workout and accounting and auditing
capacity, a strengthened framework for competition policies and their enforcement, and a stronger
and more coherent social safety net system, was an important part of the reform program and is
assessed in the Section 4.1 on achievement of objectives. The institutional development objectives
of the loan were supported by a complementary TA loan.
5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome
5.1 Outside government or IA control
The market turnaround alleviated Korea's need for BOP assistance, but did not undennine its
commitment to reform. The reform momentum was maintained as the economy began to recover.
The worsening of the political environment along with high unemployment, which continued into
1999, did delay the reduction of some labor market rigidities, but these were implemented later.
The resilience of the GOK commitment to reform can be traced to the realization that the old
economic paradigm had to change if Korea were to return to a path of strong and sustained growth
in today's globalized and more competitive economic environment.
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5.2 Within government control
The Government membership in OECD proved to be an important if intangible factor in the
Government's reform-mindedness and desire to meet OECD standards. Another factor that was
critical since the beginning of the program and continued through SAL II was the leadership of the
reformist government. The Head of Government was freer of the alliances with the chaebols than
were the previous regimes. The reformist government also sustained Korea's commitment to
reform in the midst of a rapidly improving economy and declining Bank leverage.
5.3 Within implementing agency control
One of the most important success factors was the increasing client ownership of the reform
program that took place under SAL II. The implementing agencies were instrumental in design and
implementation and fully absorbed the elements of the reform program.
5.4 Costs and Financing
The total loan amount was US$2 billion which was disbursed in two tranches, the first on October
23, 1998, the date of effectiveness, and the second on May 11, 1999. The interest rate on the loan is
the 6 month USD LIBOR, plus 0.75 percent. There is a 1.5 percent of principal service charge paid
on effectiveness, and a standard commitment charge. The loan term is 15 years with five years of
grace.
6. Sustainability
6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating
Sustainability is assessed with respect to the two main goals of SAL II: sustain the economic
recovery and continue a broader and deeper reform process. On the first count, the recovery of the
Korean economy is ahead of expectations and prospects for its sustainability are good.
Furthermore, the structural changes implemented under the reform program will better equip Korea
to fend off future crises. Sustainability is also fostered by the mass reaction to the shock of the
crisis, which left an indelible memory with the population, and has tempered the complacency that
might have developed with the strong recovery. Also, as mentioned above, strong client ownership
of the reform program augurs well for sustainability. It is possible that unfavorable political
developments or premature complacency resulting from the quick economic recovery may slow the
pace of further reform in the future, but the reversal of much of the reform implemented under the
program is considered unlikely. For these reasons, the sustainability of the SAL II program is
considered likely.
At the time of the QAG quality-at-entry review of SAL II, some concern was raised about the
sustainability of the program. It was not certain that such an ambitious pace and breadth of reform
could be sustained. The implementation record since the March 1999 QAG report has eased this
concern. The QAG also raised a concern over longer-term sustainability of corporate restructuring
in view of resistance to reform from the Top Five chaebols. However, despite this resistance, the
Government has shown determination to push through significant reform. In the case of the second
largest chaebol, Daewoo, GOK departed from the past practice of "too big to fail," when Daewoo
was forced to go through work-out proceedings. In addition, under the planned follow-up Bank
operation, the Corporate and Financial Sector Restructuring Loan (CFSRL), agreed corporate sector
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reform measures were largely implemented, despite the loan never going to the Board since Korea
did not need the financing anymore given its strong economic recovery and build-up of reserves.
Another possible threat to sustainability is the increase in public debt. It is considerably higher than
at the start of the crisis, limiting the Government's fiscal room for maneuver in the event of possible
future shocks. Fortunately, it is still at a comparatively low 30 percent of GDP.
6.2 Program follow-up
As noted, GOK continued to implement the follow-up CFSRL program even though CFSRL never
went to the Board. This was an important demonstration of the Government's recognition of the
need to continue financial and corporate sector restructuring, and of its resolve to sustain the reform
effort. Sustainability of increasing transparency is ensured by the legal and institutional changes
that were made. Another important development is that GOK is firmnly supporting further
improvements in corporate governance which would increase the likelihood of continued progress.
While the adjustment lending phase is now over, the Bank will continue to support the reform
program in all the areas covered by the SALs-financial, corporate and social sector reforms-
through non-lending, analytical and advisory services under a knowledge partnership with the
Korean Government.
7. Bank and Borrower Performance
SAL II had the dual purpose of providing quick disbursing BOP support to Korea to lower the
chance of a second wave of crisis and supporting a longer term structural reform program. The
Bank managed this dual objective well as the tranche conditions were directly linked to significant
impacts, such as legislative and regulatory changes, capacity building, and implementation of social
programs. The beneficial impact of some of the fundamental changes, such as in corporate
governance, will be fully realized over time as changes in the regulatory and institutional regime
translate into actual changes in corporate behavior.
Bank
7.1 Lending. The Bank developed a cooperative relationship with Korean counterparts which was
very beneficial to the financial and corporate restructuring program and the development of FSC.
In corporate governance, the Koreans went farther in some areas under SAL I than expected, so by
SAL II, the Bank was able to recalibrate its program to set more ambitious goals for the component.
In other areas, the GOK was more resistant to reforrns and the Bank's position was repeatedly
challenged. For example, the Bank had to be particularly firm on the establishment of audit
committees of boards of directors. The Koreans vigorously debated some reforms, but once
convinced, their implementation was equally vigorous.
7.2 Supervision. Close supervision by the Bank contributed to an overall satisfactory
implementation of the reform program. In the course of the supervision, Bank staff provided
substantial analytical and advisory inputs to the implementing agencies. Prograrn implementation
was also helped by the parallel TA loan, especially in corporate and financial reform.
The Bank exerted a great deal of effort to push the Korea First and Seoul Bank privatizations. In
reality, neither of the two banks was privatized by the release of the second tranche, but both had
letters of intent from potential purchasers to do so. Because of the specific wording of the tranche
condition, a waiver of the condition was not required in order to release the second tranche. The
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Bank management was confident that the two letters of intent would surely result in at least one
privatization transaction (as indeed happened later in 1999).
The Bank demonstrated realistic expectations in allowing financial institutions to achieve capital
adequacy with full provisioning in steps. A more ambitious timeframe could have caused a
systemic failure by putting too much pressure on the financial and corporate sectors.
7.3 Overall Bank Performance
Bank performance is rated as satisfactory. The progress of Korean reforms compared favorably to
any other Asian crisis country. Even though the Bank's leverage waned as the crisis ebbed, the
Bank had helped GOK develop and implement a program that is fundamentally reforming the
financial, corporate and social sectors. The Bank was firm on policy measures it considered critical
despite initial Government resistance to some of them, and pressed for ambitious schedules so that
Korea could differentiate itself from other crisis countries. In the end, once policy discussions were
concluded, the Government had strong ownership of the reform program. Policy discussions were
informed and helped by complementary economic and sector work, including a CEM that
developed some of the analytical underpinnings. The T.A. provided in parallel with SAL II was
very effective and has provided a vehicle to continue to support reforms beyond the SAL II
operation.
The Bank's partnership with the IMF in their joint effort to ease the crisis and help Korea build a
path to long-term sustainable growth matured into one of good coordination. Early in the program,
the Bank lobbied the IMF successfully to move toward an easing of the fiscal stance to stimulate the
economy. Issues also arose initially about the division of labor in areas of structural reform but
were resolved. As the program progressed, the Bank and IMF worked together increasingly
effectively, the Bank leading the work on corporate restructuring and social protection and working
together with the IMF in the financial sector. To ensure close coordination and consistency, the two
staffs collaborated actively both at headquarters and in the field, including through joint missions
and joint communications with the Government.
Borrower
7.4 Preparation
As a continuation of the overall stabilization, recovery and structural reform program, the GOK's
preparation performance during SAL II benefited from successful lending operations under the ERL
and SAL I. GOK demonstrated the ability to contribute to the design of, and carry out the
conditions of, an increasingly deep and broad reform programn.
7.5 Government implementation performance
GOK implementation of the program was satisfactory overall. Implementation of the financial,
corporate, and social sector components was generally good, with the Government sometimes
exceeding targets and demonstrating a strong commitment to fundamentally change current
practices. The depth of GOK's commitment to reform was especially evident in the Daewoo case.
GOK did not step in just to bail out Daewoo. The chaebol was allowed to break up and its major
affiliates forced to restructure through workouts agreed with creditor banks, which sent the right
signal to other corporates which had been avoiding restructuring. Other companies concluded that
they would not likely be rescued by GOK, but would need to go through with restructuring and all
the pain of taking a loss on assets, overhauling management and restructuring operations.
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7.6 Implementing agency
The Korean officials were very disciplined counterparts who carried out the details of the reform
components well. There were some delays, but overall implementation performance was
satisfactory. Implementing agencies' performance was greatly helped by the availability of TA,
especially in meeting the second tranche conditions, such as in supporting diagnostics and reviews.
7.7 Overall Borrower performance
The Koreans proved to be tough negotiators, but once persuaded and committed to reform actions,
their follow-through tended to be strong and thorough. Because of the strength of the Korean
Government's commitment to reform, widespread change could be achieved in a relatively short
amount of time. Koreans showed a high degree of political commitment to reforms led by the
President himself. This commitment to reform 'has extended beyond SAL II with the
implementation of much of the reform program agreed under the proposed Corporate and Financial
Sector Restructuring Loan (CFSRL), even though the loan did not go to the Board.
8. Lessons Learned
Client ownership is essential to a strong reform program and its sustainability. During the
course of the three adjustment operations, GOK developed a stronger ability to design and
implement reforms and became increasingly convinced of their necessity to return to a path of
sustainable long-term growth. Substantial analytical and advisory input provided by Bank staff in
the process of policy discussions, and the depth of the dialogue that took place with the client,
helped build client conviction and ownership.
Contact with the private sector and non-government stakeholders enhances the chances for
recovery and reform. The Bank team kept in close contact with the thinking and reactions of the
private sector, recognizing that the recovery was to be private-sector led. The Bank was also
effective in informally involving some of the brain trusts of universities and the many think tanks in
the country. In some areas, additional involvement of non-government stakeholders would have
been beneficial. If, for example, private stakeholders who would stand to benefit from the reforms
were included more explicitly in the policy dialogue, then more support and more efficient
mobilization of pro-reform forces could have occurred. In the case of the audit committee of boards
of directors, it might have been helpful for users of financial information, such as institutional
investors, to be part of the reform dialogue to argue for independent audit committees. Those
groups that would gain would have been better informed as to what was going on, been better able
to mobilize more cohesive support, and could have strengthened the World Bank's hand in
discussions.
An integrated, comprehensive approach that keeps track of intersectoral linkages and
sequencing makes a reform program more effective and sustainable. While the reform program
covered a broad spectrum of reforms, individual reform components were subjected to the
discipline of a well-integrated and coherent overall reform framework that took account of linkages
and priorities and ensured consistency. The program dealt well with corporate and financial sector
restructuring and macroeconomic linkages as well as linkages to and within social sector reforms.
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A strong up front approach to developing social safety nets is important to building and
maintaining public support for the reform program. The SAL II program took into account the
need to provide social safety nets to cushion the impact of the crisis and corporate and financial
sector restructuring. The program to strengthen the social safety nets was comprehensive and
designed in a collaborative process with the Government. The cushion provided by the safety nets
proved to be an essential element in public support for the overall reform program.
The ability to identify highly experienced staff within the Bank was critical to supporting the
reform program and greatly enhanced its success. Bank staff on the Korea Team were the most
experienced in their fields. The availability of these Bank staff for a period of 2 years provided
continuity.
It is important for a country that is part of a regional crisis to differentiate itself (positively) if
possible. Korea demonstrated that it was reforming at a faster rate and was as serious or more
serious than any other crisis country about fundamental structural reforms. In so doing Korea was
elevated in the view of the international financial community and avoided being dragged down by
other crisis countries that might be struggling and stalling on reforms.
Low public debt, resulting from prudent macroeconomic management, affords a big
advantage in dealing with a financial crisis. In responding to the crisis, Korea was fortunate to
have a very low level of public debt. This position allowed the Government to play a large and
prompt role in recapitalizing the banking sector, which included the injection of W64 trillion to
support financial sector restructuring and recapitalization. Korea could also more easily finance a
more comprehensive social safety net.
Incentives to carry out the program are not necessarily the same as the incentives faced by
Bank counterparts. The audience that the Bank faces in policy discussions is often government
officials who may have a conflict of interest with the very substance of the program. Requiring an
independent accounting board to oversee the accounting profession, for example, was basically
replacing the Government official who was currently responsible for that function, but he was also
the same official with whom the Bank was having the dialogue. To overcome this conflict, it is
useful to broaden the participation in discussions to include non-government stakeholders who
would stand to gain from the reforms.
TA can be critical to implementing components of the reform program and helps broaden the
base of the dialogue to include the technocrats who will actually implement the program. In
corporate governance, relatively small amounts of TA were able to provide the key studies that
supported the design and implementation of reforms. For example, TA funded key reviews and
diagnostics for the Korean Accounting Standards Board. In general, in designing an adjustment
operation, the dialogue is with a narrow group of key decision-makers.
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The Bank might want to find a faster mechanism for TA that supports a large structural,
quick disbursing adjustment operation. In addition to the at times slow process at the Bank, the
relatively centralized process for allocating TA resources within the Korean Government also made
expeditious use of these resources more difficult. Where several implementing agencies are
involved, seven in the case of the TA loan for Financial and Corporate Sector Restructuring, a more
decentralized approach would facilitate faster implementation of the TA.
At the outset of a crisis, a strong government role can be very good for rapid progress. The
Government took a decisive role in restructuring, providing strong leadership to the reform
program. This was particularly necessary in corporate restructuring where reform faced strong and
powerful entrenched interests. After the initial crisis subsides, a more market based approach can
and should evolve.
9. Partner Comments
Recent Economic Performance
Korea's recovery from near collapse has been quicker and deeper than expected, due to the swift
implementation of a bold restructuring program fully supported by the international financial
institutions (IFIs) and the private sector. In the first quarter of 1999, GDP grew 4.6 percent. In the
second quarter, it surged 9.8 percent due to increased domestic demand as well as brisk exports of
semiconductors, vehicles and computers. Private consumption rose 7.6 percent and facilities
investment surged 24.8 percent in the first half of 1999. The high rate of growth in facilities
investment indicated that the recovery would be sustainable. Despite the surge in growth, there has
been no inflationary pressure. In fact, in the first eight months of 1999, inflation fell to 0.7 percent,
the lowest level in 30 years. The unemployment rate also declined in 1999, falling to 6.2 percent in
July after peaking at 8.6 percent in February 1999. The foreign exchange rate continued to show
remarkable stability, and thanks to a continued current account surplus and record inflows of
foreign capital, the nation's usable foreign reserves rose to an all-time high of U$60.43 billion in
July 1999.
Because Korea's currency crisis resulted from a weak financial system, restoring financial
soundness was crucial to recovery. Quick moves were taken to overhaul the entire sector, and
ailing financial institutions were either closed or merged. In the financial market, great strides have
been made on the Korea Stock Exchange. Since hitting a low of 280 in 1998, the stock price index
has steadily increased, at one point breaking the 1,000 point on July 7 of 1999, an all time high.
Interest rates have remained in the single digits since November 1998. Successful restructuring of
the financial sector has stabilized the financial market, lowered interest rates, and improved
macroeconomic indicators. Theses favorable economic conditions have, in turn, improved-
corporate profits and contributed in part to dramatic improvements in corporate capital structures.
Transforming Korea's Economy
The ultimate goal of the structural reforms pursued by President Kim is to establish a new economic
paradigm based on market principles. In the financial sector, the focus has shifted to upgrading the
software side of the system. The goal is to establish accountable and independent management
systems, capable of extending credit to small and medium-sized enterprises with promising
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technology but no collateral. In the corporate sector, more intensive corporate restructuring is
needed to carry out fundamental changes and sharpen the competitive edge of the corporate sector.
In today's globalized economy, group-wide management and volume-oriented growth dependent on
borrowed capital are no longer viable. Management autonomy, a profit orientation and transparent
cooperation among subsidiaries will be key factors in boosting corporate competitiveness and the
country's sustainable prosperity. Korea's reform agenda has also been aided substantially by the
SAL II program, as the World Bank was firm on policy measures it considered critical for the
restructuring of financial and corporate sectors in Korea.
Lessons Learned from the SAL II
Based on its experiences with the SAL II, Korea has come up with a set of recommendations that
may aid in designing a better policy framework in the future. First, the role of the World Bank and
the IMF during policy matrix consultations should be more reasonably divided, especially with
regard to the financial sector. There have been occasions in which each institution has presented us
with differing views on the same subject, making it difficult for Korean officials to respond with
consistency. Better coordination between the two institutions would have prevented unnecessary
complications. Second, country-specific conditions should be more appropriately reflected in the
design and implementation of a policy program. In particular, considering that different practices
have taken hold in the US, Europe, and Asia over a long period, the best practices cannot be easily
put in place within a short period in every client country. Third, the objectives of the SAL II were
too ambitious to comprehensively cover all areas of reform. Thus, it may have been more effective
if its programs had concentrated on key issues in target areas such as financial and corporate sector
reform.
Continuing Tasks for the New Millennium
Korea's resolve does not stop at the achievements of the past two years. In order to sustain
economic growth and prevent future crisis, we will continue to push forward with our reform
agenda. We are also addressing the inevitable adverse effects of our crisis resolution measures,
such as widened income disparities. Furthermore, we are quickly adapting to the changing
economic environment marked by the information-technology revolution. This will enable us to
build a competitive digital economy and to best meet the challenges of the new century.
10. Additional Information
NA
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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix
Outcome / Impact Indicators:
Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR1 Actual/Latest Estimate
Refer to SAL II Policy Matrix-Annex 8
Output Indicators:
Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR1 Actual/Latest Estimate
Refer to SAL II Policy Matrix-Annex 8
1 End of project
Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing
Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)
Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Appraisal
Estimate Estimate
Project Cost By Component US $million US $million
Total Baseline Cost 2,000 2,000 100
Total Project Costs 2,000 2,000 100
Total Financing Required 2,000 2,000 100
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Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)
Procurement Methodl
Expenditure Category ICB NCB Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost
1. Works
No Procurement Categories--
All BOP Support
2. Miscellaneous
Total
Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)
Procurement Method 1
Expenditure Category ICB NCB Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost
1. Works
No Procurement Categories--
All BOP Support
2. Miscellaneous
Total
Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)
Percentage of
Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Appraisal
Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF.
BOP Assistance 2,000 2,000 100
Annex 3: Economic Costs and Benefits
Not Applicable
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Annex 4. Bank Inputs
(a) Missions:
Stage of Project Cycle Performance Rating
No. of Persons and Specialty
(e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.)
Count Specialty Implementation Development
Month/Year Progress Objective
Identification/Preparation
July-August 1998 27 E-3, F-7, Corp.-2, L-1, S-7, CG-2, S S
Comp.-2, Priv.-2
Appraisal/Negotiation
S S
September 1998 17 E-2, F-4, Corp.-2, L-1, S-3, CG-2,
Comp.-I, Priv.-1
Supervision
October 1998-June 1999 17 E-3, F-4, Corp.-2, L-1, S-3, CG-2,
Comp.-1, Priv.-1 S S
ICR
13 E-3, F-1, Corp.-2, L-1, S-2, CG-2,
Comp.-2 S S
E-Economist (macro), F-Financial, Corp.-Corporate restructuring, L-Legal, S-Labor market and social safety
net, CG-Corporate governance, Comp.-Competition, Priv.-Reform and privatization of SOEs
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(b) Staff:
Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate
No. Staff weeks Amount (US$ 000)
Identification/Preparation 50.0 221.6
Appraisal/Negotiation 25.7 118.1
Supervision 69.0 309.5
ICR 10.1 37.1
Total 154.8 686.3
Amounts shown differ from those in SAP as they are adjusted for misposting of expenditures that could not be corrected due to the
switch to the new SAP system.
Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components
(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)
Rating
Macro policies H
Sector policies SU
Physical SU
Financial SU
Institutional development SU
Environmental NA
Social
Poverty Reduction SU
Gender NA
Other SU
Private sector development SU
Public sector management SU
Other NA
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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance
(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)
6.1 Bank perfornance Rating
Lending S
Supervision S
Overall S
6.2 Borrower performance Rating
Preparation S
Goveinment Implementation Perfonnance S
Implementation agency performance S
Overall S
Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents
Report of the President-Second Structural Adjustment Loan, October 2, 1998
Loan Agreement (and annexes)
Assessment of Quality at Entry by the Quality Assurance Group-March 5, 1999
Regional Response to Quality at Entry Assessment-April 1999
Nomination for 1999 Awards for Excellence-March 1999
Release of Second Tranche - Waiver of One Condition-April 29, 1999
Press Release February 29, 2000-World Bank Commends South Korea's Progress on Structural
Reform
Letter of Development Policy January 2000, Proposed Corporate and Financial Sector Restructuring
Loan
Korea Will Continue to Push Economic Reform and Restructuring-Address by President Kim Dae-jung, December 3, 1999
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ANNEX 8: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN II - LETTER OF DEVELOPMENT
POLICY AND POLICY MATRIX
Seoul, Korea
September 24, 1998
Mr. James D. Wolfensohn
President
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Washington, D.C., 20433
Dear Mr. President:
SUBJECT: PROPOSED SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
Letter of Development Policy
1. In response to the economic crisis, the Korean Government embarked on a major
structural reform program last December. Since then, we have made substantial progress in the
implementation of this reform program, despite a difficult macroeconomic setting and associated
social and political pressures. Our commitment to structural reform reflects our conviction that
the response to the crisis must not just deal with its immediate symptoms but address its root
causes. We fully recognize that fundamental reforms are needed in the incentives and
institutional framework to restore Korea's economic performance in today's more integrated and
competitive global economy.
2. Our economic reform program has two main objectives: restoring macrofinancial
stability while limiting the costs to the real economy and the impact on the vulnerable; and
strengthening the economy's structural foundation to lay the basis for resumption of strong and
sustainable growth. We have made considerable progress in restoring stability in the foreign
exchange market and rebuilding external reserves. However, the impact of the crisis on the
domestic economy has been severe. We have responded to this situation by adjusting our
macroeconomic policies to mitigate the severity of the recession and support an early recovery of
domestic demand, consistent with sustaining the hard-won gains in restoring external financial
stability. We will continue to work closely with the IMF in ensuring that our macroeconomic
policy framework remains sound and responsive to the economic situation. In the area of
structural reform, where we are working closely with the World Bank, we have intensified our
efforts in all keys areas of reform, including the reform of the financial system, restructuring of
the corporate sector, and strengthening of social safety nets.
3. In the design and implementation of our structural reform program, we have received
important support from the World Bank, first through an Economic Reconstruction Loan (ERL)
and then a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL). In recent weeks, we have held intensive
discussions with the World Bank, and have reached a common understanding on the next stage of
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reforms. Details of policy actions that we will take under the reform program agreed with the
Bank are provided in the attached Policy Matrix. As you will see, these actions constitute a strong
and comprehensive reform program. We seek World Bank support for this program through a
Second Structural Adjustment Loan.
4. Building on the progress made under the previous loans, the program described in the
Policy Matrix aims to achieve a major deepening of reformis in three key policy areas: financial
sector reform; corporate sector restructuring; and labor market reform and strengthening of social
safety nets. In all of these areas, the program includes substantial up-front actions. While the
details are provided in the Policy Matrix, allow me to highlight some important elements of the
reform program.
5. In the financial sector, we are giving priority to the resolution of troubled financial
institutions, but are also taking steps to improve the regulatory and institutional framework to
support sound development of the financial system in the future. The program includes the
following main elements: resolution of weak financial institutions, especially banks, based on a
timetable and decision criteria on resolution options agreed with the Bank, and supported by
diagnostic reviews and assessment of bank rehabilitation and implementation plans; adoption and
application of principles and processes, agreed with the Bank, for the use of public resources in
financial sector restructuring and recapitalization and for the management of the acquired assets;
enhancement of the independence, authority and institutional capacity of the agency charged with
consolidated supervision of the financial sector-FSC; strengthening of prudential regulations,
especially those relating to large exposures and connected lending; and development of the
capital market through encouragement of new institutional investors (e.g., mutual funds) and
asset securitization, standardization of government bond issues, and strengthening of securities
market prudential rules and self-regulated organizations.
6. In the corporate sector, we have established, in consultation with the Bank, a framework
for corporate debt workouts led by creditor banks under guidelines established by the FSC and
linked to financial sector restructuring. The workout process will be supported by policies to limit
"emergency" loans; reduce cross-guaranties; facilitate debt-equity swaps, asset sales, and
mergers and acquisitions; remove tax disincentives; and further improve insolvency laws and
procedures. We will ensure that corporate debt restructuring takes place in a market-based
manner, through voluntary workouts between corporations and their creditors subject to the rules
and guidelines that have been established by the FSC and are described in the Policy Matrix. We
will promote corporate restructuring vehicles that are privately financed and managed. We will
avoid direct government interventions in the corporate restructuring process that can be distortive
and that entail moral hazard. The Government has announced on September 8, 1998 that it will
not entertain any demands from the chaebol for special financial or fiscal privileges, such as from
the top five chaebol in support of the recently announced mergers of some of their industrial units
known as "big-deals," that depart from the discipline and transparency of the framework for
corporate restructuring agreed with the Bank and described in the Policy Matrix.
7. To restore, and sustain, financial viability and competitiveness, Korean firms need both
financial and real restructuring. The latter requires improvements in the governance of firms and
increased exposure to competitive pressures. Our program for improvements in corporate
governance includes strengthening of the responsibilities, independence and accountability of
corporate boards; enhancement of minority shareholder and institutional investor rights; and
improvement of the legal framework for creditors' rights. Financial transparency and
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accountability will be enhanced by the adoption of accounting, auditing and reporting standards
for financial institutions and corporations that are consistent with international best practice,
strengthening of the internal audit function and the financial oversight role of boards of directors,
and enhancement of the role of independent professional bodies in standard-setting and oversight
in accounting and auditing. Policies to enhance competition will include strengthening the Fair
Trade Act and its enforcement; tightening the regulation of cartels and preventing collusion;
ensuring a competitive framework for chaebol restructuring; further liberalizing foreign
investment; and simplifying import certification procedures. The establishment of holding
companies will be allowed in order to provide a more transparent ownership framework for
corporate groups.
8. Building on the understandings reached under SAL I, the Government has initiated a
major program of reform and privatization of state-owned corporations. The program includes
opening the major infrastructure sectors to private participation. In this regard, an important focus
of our policy will be the timely implementation of regulatory and institutional reforms in the
infrastructure sectors to be privatized in order to ensure that the planned privatization takes place
in a transparent and competitive framework and yields maximum efficiency benefits.
9. In the area of labor market and social safety nets, our program comprises two main
elements: improving the functioning of the labor market to facilitate economic restructuring; and
strengthening the social safety net, both to mitigate the social costs of the current crisis and
structural change and to make tangible, lasting improvements in Korea's system of social
protection. We will fully implement the reform enacted in February this year legalizing layoffs,
and will further enhance labor market flexibility by actions to reduce remaining market rigidities.
Our labor market agenda also includes strengthening employment services and amending active
labor market programs based on a critical review of their cost-effectiveness.
10. With the support of the World Bank, we have substantially strengthened our social safety
net programs. With effect from October 1998, unemployment insurance will be extended to firms
employing fewer than five workers and to temporary and part-time workers. Contribution rates
will be adjusted to maintain the financial viability of the insurance scheme. For those not
covered by unemployment insurance, we will expand the public works program and the means-
tested non-contributory income support program for the unemployed poor. We are committed to
expand in real terms budget allocations for poverty-targeted programs, such as the livelihood
protection program, proportionately with any increase in the prevalence of poverty as a result of
the crisis. We are also initiating a reform of our health insurance, to increase the protection of
poor beneficiaries, improve the coverage of major financial risks, and raise administrative
efficiency. Our continuing efforts in pension system reform focus on ensuring the adequacy of
"social pension" for the elderly poor, and improving the transparency and efficiency of pension
fund management and strengthening links to capital market development.
11. The Government will work closely with the Bank in implementing the reform program
described above. To facilitate monitoring of progress on the reforms, we will provide the Bank
relevant and timely information on the implementation of policies in all areas covered by the
structural reform program and detailed in the Policy Matrix. On progress with corporate debt
restructuring within the framework set out in the Policy Matrix, we will provide regular
information in accordance with frequency and format agreed with the Bank. We will continue to
provide periodic information on key indicators for the financial sector as agreed under the ERL.
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Also, we will provide infornation on selected indicators to help monitor the effects of policy
reforms as agreed under the SAL, and on any additional such indicators proposed by the Bank.
12. We reaffirm our commitments made under the ERL, and the SAL to halt directed lending
and policy loans. We also reaffirm our commitments made under these loans with respect to the
transparency of fiscal accounting.
13. In order to promote public awareness of our reform program, we will make full
disclosure to the public of the program agreed with the World Bank, including making public the
full text of this letter and its attached Policy Matrix and annexes.
14. In conclusion, Korea, under the leadership of President Kim rDae-Jung, remains fully
committed to its reform program aimed at bringing about a major restructuring of its economy in
order to restore strong and sustainable growth. The World Bank's continuing support to our
program would be of invaluable help in enabling Korea meet the challenges of restructuring and
achieve its growth and development objectives.
Kyu-Sung Lee
Minister of Finance and Economy
Attachment: Policy Matrix
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KOREA - SAL II Policy Matrix
Macroeconomic Framework
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Restoration of financial stability and Sound management of macroeconomic policies-fiscal, Continued adherence to a sound macroeconomic
resumption of sustainable growth. monetary, exchange rate, and external debt and reserve framework.
management policies-conducive to financial stability and an
early recovery of economic activity.
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KOREA - SAL II Policy Matrix
Financial Sector Reform
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Resolution of Weak Financial
Institutions
Develop financial sector Further develop and clarify strategy, in consultation with the Bank, Continue to develop strategy (supported by TA). Issue written
restructuring strategy including ensuring adequacy of public resources for use in policies and guidelines consistent with that strategy (ongoing).
recapitalizing and restructuring the financial system. In consultation with the Bank, adopt process and principles
necessary to ensure adequate public resources will be made
available by Govermnent in financial system recapitalization and
restructuring.
Resolve 5 undercapitalized FSC to agree specific contract terms with acquiring banks and Monitor implementation of contracts and performance
commercial banks communicate complete contract terms to Bank (August 31). Terms (ongoing).
shall include: i) firm agreement on definition of amount and approach
to non-performing assets subject to put-back taking into consideration
non only past due status, but also qualitative factors affecting loss
potential; ii) provision of enough time for acquiring banks to evaluate
quality of acquired assets; iii) finality of contractual terms precluding
subsequent renegotiation by acquiring banks.
Resolve 7 undercapitalized Banks to submit implementation plans by July 31. Announcement by FSC of its decision on implementation plans
commercial banks FSC to distribute a template for review of implementation plans of the by September 30 (decision processes supported by domestic and
four largest conditionally approved banks to aid in evaluating the international experts, chosen in consultation with the Bank).
feasibility of banks' plans. (July 31). Banks whose implementation plans are not approved to be
FSC to contract, under TORs agreed with Bank, with international subject to direct recapitalization, mandatory mergers, transfer of
experts to support in-depth analysis of the banks' implementation business under P&A, or exit under PCA procedures.
plans and any other submissions by banks related to the provision of For banks which are subject to direct recapitalization by
government financial support (September 15). government, government will assume the responsibilities of
Adopt objectives and principles, acceptable to the Bank, to be used by ownership, including contracting with experienced senior
Government in making decisions on banks' implementation plans, managers to undertake restructuring, until sale to strategic
including provision of financial support by Government (August 31). investors with sufficient capital and expertise to manage banks.
If a plan is approved, the bank will agree on an MOU with FSC
covering, among others, recapitalization and merger plans,
measures to manage and reduce non-performing assets, and
timetable for achieving performance indicators (including capital
adequacy targets). Dividend payments to be allowed only when
performance indicators are met.
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Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Banks whose approved plans are not, in the event, achieved will
be subject to PCA.
Evaluate remaining commercial banks Initiate diagnostic reviews of remaining commercial banks (on the If a commercial bank's capital ratio is found to be below 8% as
and take appropriate actions basis of June 30 data) by internationally recognized accounting firms, of end-June 1998, FSC will proceed on a similar basis to that
signed by domestic and international partners (August 15). described above for 7 banks (September 30). If the capital ratio
of a bank that had been above 8% subsequently falls below 8%,
FSC will invoke PCA procedures.
Based on the diagnostic review results, administrative guidance
to strengthen banks' operations will be provided.
Complete privatization of Korea First Government to agree with the lead manager selected for privatization FSC/FSB will continue to conduct intensive supervision of these
Bank and Seoul Bank on the general deal structure (including confirmation to the Bank of two banks, including in-depth analysis of management capacity,
the modalities of provision of public support), and to authorize lead rehabilitation strategy, and financial condition (September 30).
manager to contact investors (September 15). Obtain bids for sale of the banks to strategic investors with
sufficient capital and expertise to manage banks (November 15);
achieve progress, satisfactory to the Bank, toward sale.
Evaluate remaining merchant banks FSC/FSB to strengthen supervision of existing merchant banks, Implement strengthened supervision (ongoing).
including conducting on-site examinations to update assessment of Banks falling short of minimal capital adequacy requirements or
financial condition, determine capital ratio integrity, and assess in substantial non-compliance with previously agreed
compliance with previously approved rehabilitation plans (August 31). rehabilitation plans, subject to resolution process.
Review specialized and Sign contracts for diagnostic reviews, including assessment of asset Complete diagnostic reviews of at least the major specialized and
development banks quality, with internationally recognized accounting firms, as for development banks (December 15).
commercial banks (September).
Use of public funds
Adopt sound principles for the use of Government confirms that public funds will be used only: Firm adherence to these principles for the use of public funds
public funds in financial system * in the context of: i) FSC-approved plans developed by banks for (ongoing).
restructtuing and recapitalization restrucuring and recapitalization, whether as stand-alone entities
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Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
or via acquisitions or mergers; ii) government takeover of
undercapitalized banks; or iii) bank liquidation;
* with adequate burden sharing, including contribution of new
capital by qualified investors and/or dilution of ownership
interests of existing shareholders;
* where acquisition of equity positions in governrment recapitalized
banks will be through a transparent process and open bidding
(exceptions to open bidding must have strong justification);
* where the bank is making adequate progress on implementation of
sound corporate debt restructuring; and
* in the context of NBFI resolutions, to cover the difference
between explicitly government-guaranteed liabilities and the
market value of assets acquired by purchasers, or to payoff
explicitly government-guaranteed liabilities in the case of
liquidation. Any additional use of public funds for NBFIs will be
limited to exceptional cases where failure of these institutions
poses a systemic risk. Any such use of public funds would be
made in the context of a comprehensive restructuring plan for the
relevant NBFI sector.
Resolve policy issues regarding Purchases by KAMCO will be at prices that reflect actual and expected Adoption by KAMCO of principles, acceptable to the Bank, for
asset management recovery rates as well as the opportunity cost of the funds employed the disposition of troubled assets acquired by KAMCO, including
for collateralized loans, and nominal prices for unsecured loans the sale of a majority of assets within three years of acquisition.
(August 31). Adoption of procedures, sources and instruments of funding for
KAMCO acceptable to the Bank (December 15).
Strengthen KAMCO's financial Agree to publish complete semi-annual and annual audited financial Contract with audit firm, with the first audit to be conducted on
reporting and disclosure statements (which include results of reviews of asset portfolio June 30, 1999 financial statement (December 15).
revaluations) prepared by an audit firm with international experience
in asset revaluation (August 31).
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Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Strengthen KAMCO's Hire qualified experts to assist in the design and implementation of the Complete design and agree to implement recommended actions
infrastructure organizational and operational structure based on TORs acceptable to (December 15).
the Bank (August 31). Installation of system in process (ongoing).
Contract with data management (MIS) firm with proven track record, Contract with at least one international asset management
according to TORs agreed with the Bank, for installation of asset company to manage and sell assets, according to TORs agreed
inventory and management information systems (August 31). with the Bank (October 31), and have the asset management
company in place (December 15).
Strengthen Supervision and
Regulation
Strengthen independence and Prepare three-year FSB operating budget. Allocate adequate, separate Consistent with the Basle Committee's 25 Core Principles for
authority of supervisory agencies funds for FSB startup costs, and initial operating and extraordinary Effective Banking Supervision, enhance independence of
expenses (including costs of procuring information technology, and FSC/FSB through ensuring operational independence and
TA needs). adequate resources. Issuance and revocation of financial
institutions' licenses to be carried out upon recommendation of
FSC. Review the adequacy and effectiveness of FSC's
govemance structure and organization, including the need for
greater representation of members nominated by independent
associations as the current FSC members' terms expire.
Establish the legal framework through which FSB may assess
fees on supervised institutions, with revenues specifically
dedicated to the operations of FSB. Evaluate funding needs and
establish FSB's intemal budgetary and fimding systems
(December 15).
Complete unification of supervisory organizations. Enhance
consolidated supervision and extend supervisory arrangements
for commercial banks to all NBFIs as appropriate (December).
Institutionally strengthen FSC Request proposal for contract with intemationally recognized Establish management group within FSB and implement
consultant firm, according to TORs agreed with Bank, to implement enhanced managerial structure (December 15). Implement other
the strategic blueprint for FSC/FSB institution building, supervisory major elements of strategic blueprint, including information
consolidation, information technology, upgrade of human resources, systems, policies, operational procedures, human resources, and
and strengthening of supervisory policies and processes (August 31). budgetary/administrative functions. Contract signed with
FSC/FSB to establish and operationalize a special implementation task intemationally recognized consultant firm (September 30) and
force fully dedicated to the tasks of agency consolidation and major elements implemented (December 15).
strengthening of supervision and human resources. Task force to
report to Chairman of FSC and empowered to access personnel in each
of the 4 supervisory agencies (August 31).
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First Tranche Second Tranche
Enhance supervision With respect to specialized and development banks, delegate to FSC On the basis of examinations of specialized and development
powers to examine and to make recommendations as to consequential banks at the delegation of MOFE, FSC will make
remedial actions for these institutions (August 31). recommendations to MOFE as to any consequential remedial
action required (ongoing).
FSB to strengthen supervisory policies, processes and procedures
for all subject financial institutions, including on-site supervision,
off-site surveillance, monitoring, and enforcement.
Upgrade regulation Issue implementation plan to bring Korea's prudential regulations Issue regulations to extend, effective January 1, 1999, prudential
closer to international practice as expressed in Basle Committee's 25 rules applied to commercial banks to specialized and
Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (August 15). Plan will development banks taking into account the special characteristics
cover rules relating to capital definition, loan classification, disclosure of the institutions (November 15).
of trust accounts, segregation of trust accounts and treatment of trust Extend connected lending regulations that apply to commercial
accounts with guarantees as on-balance sheet items. banks to merchant banks. Adopt timetable for reductions in
Submit legislation to amend the Act Concerning the Structural connected lending limits; connected lending audited and
Improvement of the Financial Industry, inter alia, to redefine a disclosed in annual financial statements (effective January 1,
"distressed" financial institution so as to allow imposition of sanctions 1999).
before actual insolvency and to permit the full write down of Submit to National Assembly amendments to General Banking
shareholder equity (August 31). Act, and similar act for merchant banks, to lower single borrower
and group exposure limits over time (October 31).
Improve troubled debt restructuring Issue guidelines by FSC for troubled debt restructuring and
workout processes in banks, including best practice regulations
regarding treatment of Other Assets Owned (including maximum
holding periods, yearly valuations, validation by third-parties,
and write-downs, if necessary), workout policies, and asset
management plans (October).
Rationalize deposit insurance Rationalize deposit insurance scheme, including through phasing I
out of general guarantee (ongoing).
Capital Market Development
Enhance functioning and Strengthen prudential rules for securities markets' activities of all
competitiveness of securities markets financial institutions, including strengthening standards for internal
risk management, adoption of appropriate timetable for moving to
mark-to-market accounting for all financial institutions, and use of
credit rating (August).
Develop implementation plans, with timetable to: i) promote self- Submit to National Assembly necessary changes in Securities
regulation, including through delegation of increased regulatory and and Exchange Law to enhance the role of SROs (December 15).
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First Tranche Second Tranche
supervisory authority to self-regulatory organizations
(e.g., KSE, KSDA, KITCA); and ii) reform governance structure of
these SROs with the aim to promote their commercial sensitivity and
independence (September 15).
Develop implementation plan to liberalize trading systems, including Announce key elements of action plans and achieve progress in
allowing for proprietary trading systems, and to strengthen clearing implementation (December 15).
and settlement systems (September 15).
Develop bond markets As outcome of existing task force, create institutional setup to Announce key elements of action plan with appropriate timetable
formulate an action plan, with timetable, to develop bond markets to develop the bond market, including standardization of new
(primary and secondary), including: development of a (rolling) three- funding instruments and replacement of government-guaranteed
year plan for central government financing (including fumding costs bonds with sovereign bonds (December 15).
associated with financial restructuring), standardization of new Institutionally strengthen Treasury-functions (December 15).
government and government agencies' funding instruments, and Introduce a framework to develop market-makers network,
consolidation of existing instruments (August). including adoption of minimum rules and time-table to select
primary dealers in government bonds, and authorize banks to act
as market-markers in government bonds (December 15).
Develop public asset-liability Initiate external debt management component of a comprehensive, Implement actions of agreed program on external debt
system integrated external and internal public asset-liability management management component and complete report detailing actions
system (ALM), supported by Bank TA-loan (August). with timetable to extend ALM to internal debt and contingent
liability components (December 15).
Develop institutional investors Submit Securities Investment Company Act to allow, among others,
the establishment of mutual funds (August).
Submit legislation to allow asset-backed securities (August).
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, actions related to the first tranche release will have been implemented before presentation of the loan to the Executive Directors and actions
related to the second tranche release will have been implemented before the release of the second tranche.
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Supplement to Policy Matrix on Financial Sector Reform
As part of the Policy Matrix on Financial Sector Reform, the Govermnent is to adopt objectives
and principles acceptable to the Bank to be used by the Government in making decisions on the
implementation plans of the seven undercapitalized banks, and other banks so identified, including the
provision of financial support by the Government. The Govermment has adopted the following objectives
and principles:
Objectives:
* Bring in new private investors with substantial capital at risk, and who are fit and proper and will exert
a positive, professional influence on bank governance.
* Bring in new managers with proven technical and managerial skills and experience to operate and
restructure banks of comparable size.
* After receiving support, banks are adequately capitalized, have adequate liquidity and are sustainably
profitable.
* Banks undergo operational restructuring in a minimum period of time, rapidly implement world-class
risk management practices, and resume normal banking activities (e.g., lending to creditworthy finms).
* Government financial assistance to banks provided only where demonstrably less costly to the
Government than liquidation.
* Government recovers to maximum extent possible its fmnancial assistance.
* Government sells its ownership interest within shortest period possible.
Principles:
e Provision of financial support to banks by government may include equity capital contributions in the
form of cash or interest-paying financial instruments, purchase of loans, purchase of subordinated
debt, and/or guarantees on bank assets.
e Government will make transparent the criteria and processes for providing financial support.
• Govermment will attempt to attract new capital from qualified investors wherever possible, using the
provision of financial support as an inducement to new investment where required.
* Government support will be conditional upon approved restructuring ("self-rescue") plans and efforts
by banks.
e Government will make transparent its exit strategy, including publicly announcing its commitment to
sell its ownership interests as soon as possible.
* Financial support (including direct recapitalization) will be provided only after capital has been
adjusted to reflect its true value, taking into account adequate estimates of losses in currently identified
non-performing assets (NPAs), as well as losses associated with a further deterioration in loan quality.
* Existing shareholders of undercapitalized banks will suffer a significant dilution of their ownership
interests.
* In the case of mergers among undercapitalized banks, the government will provide financial support in
an amount necessary to increase resulting bank capital to 10% of risk-adjusted assets based on Basle
Committee risk-weighting criteria, and will obtain a substantial interest in the bank (generally 80 or
90% or more).
* In the case of mergers among an adequately capitalized bank and an undercapitalized bank, the
government will provide financial support in an amount necessary to increase resulting bank capital to
the level of the adequately capitalized bank, which will in all cases exceed 8% of risk-adjusted assets
based on Basle Committee risk-weighting criteria.
* In the case of an acquisition by an adequately capitalized bank of an undercapitalized bank subject to
mandatory transfer (e.g., P&A transactions), the government will provide financial support in an
amount necessary to increase resulting bank capital to the level of the adequately capitalized bank,
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which will in all cases exceed 8% of risk-adjusted assets based on Basle Committee risk-weighting
criteria.
* In cases other than mergers and acquisitions as set out above, as an inducement to new equity capital
investment the government will provide financial support in the form of equity capital in an amount
equal to equity capital contributed by new investors, in order to increase capital to 8% of risk-adjusted
assets based on Basle Committee risk-weighting criteria.
* In the case of an undercapitalized stand-alone bank where no new third-party investment is involved
but the bank is engaged in an adequate, FSC-approved self-rescue effort, the government may provide
financial support in a form other than contribution of equity capital.
* In cases other than those set out above, the government will directly recapitalize undercapitalized
banks where an analysis is performed demonstrating that liquidation is not a less costly option to
government.
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KOREA - SAL II Policy Matrix
Corporate Sector Reform
Part A: Corporate Financial Restructuring
Objectives/Policy Measures First Tranche Second Tranche
1. Develop framework and capacity to do voluntary corporate workouts
(a) Provide an overall framework of principles and FSC provides guidelines on the following:
procedures. - selection of corporate restructuring candidates;
- a Corporate Restructuring Agreement
("Agreement") to provide a structure for
creditor/debtor negotiations;
- creation and operation of a Corporate
Restructuring Coordination Committee
("Coordination Committee") to resolve inter-creditor
disputes; and
- "London rules" type principles to guide voluntary
corporate workouts (July).
FSC to monitor workouts under Agreement to Continued monitoring of the implementation of the
ensure consistency with the issued guidelines for framework and guidelines.
workouts (August).
(b) Assign responsibility for leading voluntary FSC identifies Lead Banks (July).
corporate workouts.
(c) Gain creditor support for approach to voluntary FSC obtains adherence of major creditors to
corporate workouts. Corporate Restructuring Agreement (July).
(d) Provide necessary professional resources for Lead Banks to establish workout units (July).
Lead Banks.
Lead Banks to retain internationally accredited
advisors by September 15.
(e) Provide means to resolve inter-creditor disputes. Facilitated by FSC, banks to establish a
Coordination Comnnittee (July).
Coordination Committee to hire staff by August 15
and, as necessary, retain internationally accredited
advisors.
2. Provide policy supportfor corporate restructuring
a) Curtail emergency loans. While fmnancial institutions may provide new or Monitor observance of the guidelines.
additional loans to distressed but viable corporates as
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part of a Corporate Restructuring Agreement
workout, FSC will provide guidelines for such
lending by August 15. These guidelines would
include the following:
- GOK will refrain from directing the banks to make
such loans;
- the size of any loan would normally be limited to
the shortfall needed to meet interest expense and
trade payables during the "standstill" period;
- in retum, the debtor would facilitate complete
access by the Lead Bank's financial advisors (e.g.,
auditors) to the debtor's records;
- during the standstill period, the Lead Bank's
financial advisors would assess the debtor's
viability, review the debtor's liabilities and cash flow
projections, and - as appropriate - value assets and
indicate how best to maximize the return to creditors
- i.e., through voluntary workout, composition,
reorganization, or liquidation.
In exceptional cases, debtors due to be restructured,
but not currently in the workout process, will require
new loans. In such cases, if the banks are agreeable
to providing such loans they will be provided per the
guidelines noted above and for a maximum initial
period of six months.
(b) Facilitate use of debt/equity conversions to GOK will review if there are any tax disincentives
address excessive leverage among chaebol affiliates. and regulatory impediments to the conversion of
corporate debt into equity or near equity and will
submit legislation to National Assembly as necessary
(September 15).
GOK will subrnit legislation to National Assembly
on mutual funds (August 30).
FSC will meet with experienced asset managers,
corporate turnaround experts, and investors in
distressed securities from the private sector to assess
options for "corporate restructuring vehicles"
_______________________________________ 
'(CRVs). Privately financed and managed, CRVs
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would purchase and/or manage corporate equity
acquired by financial institutions as a result of
debt/equity conversions. Key issues for FSC to
discuss with potential CRV managers would include
appropriate business forms for CRVs (e.g.,
partnerships, blind trusts, stock funds) and potential
tax, legal, and regulatory issues (August).
GOK will identify legal, tax, and regulatory Based on this review, and if necessary, GOK will
impediments - if any - to the establishment of CRVs submit legislation to the National Assembly enabling
(September 15). and regulating the formation of CRVs and removing
tax, legal, and regulatory impediments to CRV
formation and operation (December 15).
(c) Reduce cross guarantees. FSC will encourage creditors to reduce cross Ongoing
guarantees through voluntary workouts conducted
under the Corporate Restructuring Agreement
(August).
FSC will issue a communication to banks suggesting
market-based approaches for "buying out" cross
guarantees. These approaches could include, for
example, conversion of cross guarantees into
guarantor's equity or equity warrants or into a non-
guaranteed loan at a higher interest rate (August).
FSC will require financial institutions to report on FSC will establish appropriate internal interim
the stock of guaranteed loans to the 64 chaebol as of benchmarks to monitor progress toward the
June 30, 1998, by September 15; and ,starting with reduction of cross guarantees (October).
the fourth quarter of 1998, FSC will require
quarterly progress reports from banks on progress in
reducing cross guarantees for the 64 chaebol
(August 15).
(d) Provide additional encouragement for corporate GOK to submit to National Assembly proposed GOK will submit additional legislation to National
mergers and acquisitions, debt restructuring, and package of tax measures to encourage corporate Assembly removing tax disincentives to corporate
asset dispositions as means of corporate M&As, asset sales and debt restructuring (September M&As, asset disposals, and debt restructuring
restructuring. 15). (December 15).
(e) Improve procedures and coordination for court- GOK will establish a Task Force under TORs MOJ will agree to announce, based on the review, its
supervised insolvency. acceptable to the Bank to review existing insolvency draft amendments to existing insolvency laws
laws for further improvement, focusing on expedited designed to promote expedited insolvency
procedures (e.g., pre-packaged bankruptcies procedures for public hearing and subsequent
36
Objectives/Policy Measures First Tranche Second Tranche
resulting from the workout process) (September 15). submission to the National Assembly by February
1999 (December 15).
FSC and MOJ, subject to agreement with the
Supreme Court, will establish a liaison committee
comprising these three entities to ensure prompt
resolution of issues that affect both voluntary
restructuring and court-supervised insolvency
(September 15).
3. Accelerate implementation of corporate restructuring
(a) Complete "triage" analysis. Lead Banks will complete their assessment of Monitor follow-up.
chaebol affiliates (including those from the top 5)
that have received "anti-bankruptcy" loans or which
are on bank "watch" lists and will indicate whether
each is best suited for court supervision, voluntary
workout under the Corporate Restructuring
Agreement, or normal operation (July).
A special Task Force has been convened amongst Monitor follow-up.
four of the Lead Banks to focus on a system for
monitoring the top five chaebol. The Task Force will
also examine the workout programs of the top five
chaebol. The Task Force will complete its
assessment by end-September.
(b) Pursue inter-creditor agreements, under the First Creditors Council meetings will be convened Ongoing
Business Restructuring Agreement, on corporates to by each of the Lead Banks under terms of the
be restructured. Agreement (July/August).
FSC will direct each Lead Bank to provide monthly Ongoing
reports on the status of corporate workouts
(September 15).
FSC will direct the Coordination Committee to
provide monthly reports to FSC on inter-creditor
disputes and their resolution (October).
(c) Pursue a timely exit strategy for the 55 non- FSC will direct Lead Banks to stop new lending and Lead Banks to provide monthly reports to FSC on
viable corporates. withdraw existing loans for each of the 55 (July). progress in exiting the 55.
(d) Identify additional non-viable corporates. FSC will require monthly updates from Lead Banks Ongoing
on additional corporates identified as non-viable
during the course of Corporate Restructuring
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Agreement workouts (August).
(e) Initiate resolution of corporates that are not under FSC will direct Lead Banks to send auditors into Monitor follow-up.
court supervision, but which have received chaebol affiliates that have received emergency
emergency loans. loans - but which are not operating under court
supervision - and give the auditors 60 days to
review corporate liabilities, cash flow projections,
and asset values, assess viability, and indicate how to
maximize the return to creditors - e.g., through
voluntary workout, composition, reorganization, or
bankruptcy (August).
(f) Expedite resolution of corporates under court KDB will invite intemational bids under transparent Monitor next steps.
supervision in which the GOK is a major and fair procedures for Kia (July). KFB will invite
shareholder. such bids for Hanbo by September.
(g) Develop an ability to anticipate corporate default FSC will establish a "situation room" to monitor
or insolvency. corporate/financial sector solvency (July).
(h) Promote self-restructuring by the top 5 chaebol. FSC will provide guidelines to Lead Banks to Monitor implementation of the guidelines.
strengthen the "capital structure improvement plans"
of the top 5 chaebol, including decreases in
debt/equity ratios, disposal of non-viable affiliates,
and reductions in cross guarantees (July).
Fair Trade Commission will monitor and take Continued monitoring and enforcement.
actions against the top 5 chaebol that engage in anti-
competitive intra-group transactions (July). . _ _
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, actions related to the first tranche release will have been implemented before presentation of the loan to the Executive Directors
and actions related to the second tranche release will have been implemented before the release of the second tranche.
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KOREA - SAL II Policy Matrix
Corporate Sector Reform
Part B: Corporate Governance, Competition Policies, and Reform and Privatization of SOEs
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Corporate Governance
(a) Corporate Boards and
Shareholder Rights
Promote effective monitoring of Submit to National Assembly changes to the Commercial Enact the changes to the Commercial Code.
corporate performance. Code to impose on directors and "shadow" directors a duty
to act in the interests of the company .
Require listed companies to have a minimum of 25% of
their boards comprised of outside directors.
Submit to National Assembly legislation to further reduce Enact the legislation.
the thresholds for exercise of minority shareholder rights.
Establish a study team to provide a report and Completion of the report and submission of its
recommendations to Government on the introduction of recommendations to Government on the introduction of class
class action law suits. action law suits.
Establish a study team to provide a report and Complete the report, draft legislation to give effect to its
recommendations to Government on the role and functions recommendations, and announce a timetable acceptable to the
of boards of directors. Bank for submission to National Assembly.
Remove restrictions on the voting rights of institutional
investors in listed companies.
(b) Legal Frameworkfor Creditors'
Rights
Improve the insolvency system and Creation of bankruptcy commission to assist Seoul District
strengthen capacity to handle Court by handling aspects of insolvency litigation.
bankruptcy cases.
Appoint a task force comprising representatives of the Establish a pilot specialist bankruptcy court in Seoul with
judiciary and MOJ under TORs acceptable to the Bank to dedicated judges.
study the speedy adjudication of bankruptcy cases,
including the establishment of one or more specialist
bankruptcy courts.
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Facilitate lending to SMEs through Establish a Task Force to design a modem system for secured
improved tools for secured lending. lending on movables and a national registry system. The Task
Force to complete its work and make its recommendations by
December 15.
(c) Financial Transparency and
Accountability
Rationalize the institutional Establish a Task Force under TORs acceptable to the Bank Complete the review and remove all directives affecting
framework for setting standards, to review and recommend revisions to relevant laws and accounting and auditing standards and practices by various
regulating and overseeing the regulations to: rationalize the role of various govermment government agencies including the Bank Supervisory Board
accounting and auditing profession. agencies in supervising the accounting and auditing and Insurance Supervisory Board and consolidate appropriate
profession; strengthen the role of KICPA as a self- regulatory responsibility in the Securities Supervisory Board.
regulating body consistent with international best practice; Adopt and announce an implementation plan acceptable to the
and develop an implementation plan for establishing an Bank for the establishment of an independent accounting
independent accounting standard setting organization. standard setting organization by June 1999.
Commitment to establish an independent accounting
standard setting organization by June 1999. Submit to National Assembly amendments to applicable laws
and regulations to give effect to the recommendations of the
Task Force, including changes in CPA Law, External Audit
Law, and Securities and Exchange Law.
Strengthen KICPA and make it Establish a Task Force under TORs acceptable to Bank to: Complete the review and adopt a time-bound implementation
independent of government and the review and strengthen KICPA's charter, operational plan satisfactory to the Bank. Begin implementation of
primary source of guidance in structure and capacity; assess the appropriateness of rules recommended changes in rules and regulations. Submit to
auditing. and regulations on auditing including maximum audit fee, National Assembly amendments to applicable laws.
numerical restrictions based on CPA head count, minimum
audit contract period, evaluation of audit frrms by
government, and allocation of audit clients by government;
and strengthen KICPA's role in issuing auditing standards,
monitoring professional quality, enhancing professional
ethics and enforcing the code of conduct.
Upgrade accounting and auditing Adoption and issuance by FSC of improved accounting and
standards to make them consistent auditing standards for financial institutions, listed companies
with international best practice, and joint stock companies consistent with international best
requiring that financial statements of practice and prepared with participation of representatives of
companies and financial institutions internationally recognized accounting firms, and institution
be prepared in accordance with these and announcement of the requirement that financial statements
improved standards with effect from of financial institutions, listed companies, and joint stock
the 1999 reporting year, as agreed companies with assets in excess of W7 billion will be prepared
under SAL I. and audited in accordance with these standards from fiscal year
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1999. The improved accounting standards will include, inter
alia, standards covering financial instruments, leases, asset
classification, troubled debt restructuring, asset revaluation,
translation of foreign currencies, loss and income recognition,
financial statement disclosure, and combined financial
statements.
Improve the financial oversight role Complete the study on introduction of audit committees of
of boards of directors and enhance boards of directors and improvement of the effectiveness of
the effectiveness of the internal audit the internal audit function for listed companies and
function. financial institutions under TORs acceptable to the Bank, as
agreed under SAL I.
Appoint a Task Force under TORs agreed with the Bank to: Completion of the review. Adoption and announcement of an
review and rationalize the function of the audit selection implementation plan and schedule acceptable to the Bank for
committee to make it an independent and transparent entity the institution of a requirement for the establishment by listed
and develop an implementation plan to upgrade it to an companies of audit committees of boards of directors, and
audit committee of boards of directors, taking into account completion of a draft of necessary changes in laws and
the conclusions of the above study; and recommend regulations to give effect to this requirement.
changes in relevant laws and regulations.
Improve the quality and frequency of Require listed companies to publish quarterly financial
financial reporting by listed statements with adequate disclosure consistent with
companies. international best practice starting in 2000 Q1.
Competition Policies
Increase competition across all Complete draft of amendments to Fair Trade Act (FTA), Enact the amendments.
sectors. acceptable to the Bank, based on recommendations of the
Joint Public/Private Sector Committee.
Commitment to fully enforce provisions of the FTA in the KFTC to provide the Bank with a detailed report and analysis
restructuring of chaebols in accordance with the policy of all cases of chaebol M&A, divestiture and restructuring
statement issued under SAL I. notified and considered prior to the second tranche release, in a
format agreed with the Bank.
Enact the Act on Comprehensive Regulation of Cartels.
Review and propose revisions as required to the GOK
procurement guidelines to assure transparency, and limit
opportunities for collusion and corruption.
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Issue and implement comprehensive M&A guidelines. Monitor compliance, especially in chaebol restructuring.
Strengthen the enforcement of rules Apply existing laws stringently and uniformly, and propose
limiting transactions between related amendments to the FTA to further limit such transactions.
corporations, companies, financial
institutions, their owners, directors,
shareholders and employees.
Establish a more transparent Enact legislation, satisfactory to the Bank, modifying
framework for corporate group rights restrictions under the FTA on the creation of holding company
and obligations. structures so as to permit such structures subject to conditions
to avoid undue ownership concentration.
Strengthen the operational capacity Implement the agreed work plan for the Policy Analysis Develop detailed KFTC operational guidelines (e.g.,
of KFTC. and Evaluation Group. investigative guidelines) and achieve satisfactory progress in
implementing an appropriate upgrading program.
Further deregulate domestic industry Complete submissions to the Deregulation Committee on Achieve satisfactory progress in implementing necessary
to promote competition. regulatory barriers in different industries, legislative or regulatory changes.
Promote foreign direct investment. Enact the Foreign Investment Promotion Act. Implement the new Act (simplification of procedures,
improved support system).
Support competition in domestic Review customs clearance and product Achieve satisfactory progress in implementing the streamlining
IndustIy by easing import certification/registration procedures and develop a plan to plan.
requirements and administration. streamline them.
Reform and Privatization of SOEs
(a) SOE Restructuring and
Governance Reforms
Ensure that SOEs that are to remain Review the Basic Law on Management of "State- Subnit to National Assembly legislation to improve the
under state control or are to be Capitalized" Enterprises in order to improve management management structure of SOEs.
privatized gradually, operate in an structure of such SOEs, including the allocation of policy,
efficient and accountable manner. regulatory and ownership functions.
(b) General Privatization Program
Ensure that the Government's Announce a program of privatization, including Submit any necessary privatization legislation, including
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proposed privatization and SOE identification of SOEs to be offered for sale, extent of amendments to the privatization law, to National Assembly.
reform program is implemented within proposed share or asset sales and, as appropriate, proposed
a sound framework. methods and target schedule for the completion of such
proposed sales. Establish a steering committee, supported by
task forces, to oversee implementation of the privatization
program. Review need for any enabling legislation.
(c) Infrastructure Sectors
Improve regulatory and institutional Adopt and announce an overall strategy acceptable to the Satisfactory progress in implementing the privatization and
framework for increased private Bank for dealing with structural, regulatory and SOE reform progr-; - in infrastructure sectors in accordance
participation in the provision of institutional issues in privatization and SOE reform in with the principles included in the strategy statement.
infrastructure services. infrastructure sectors, including, inter alia, the priority to be
given to transition toward more competitive market
structures and establishment of appropriate regulatory
structures, and sequencing of structural, regulatory and
ownership reforms.
Undertake a study on reforms to the regulatory and Announce key elements of proposed reforms.
institutional framework for involving private participants in
greenfield infrastructure projects.
Telecommunications Undertake a study on reforms to pricing, interconnection Announce key elements of proposed reforms, including
and universal service arrangements, and the establishment timetable for implementing those reforms, prior to any further
of an independent regulatory authority. privatization of KT and, in any case, before December 15.
Power Undertake a study on structural and regulatory reforms in Announce key elements of proposed structural and regulatory
the power sector, including the establishment of an reforms, including timetable for implementing those reforms.
independent regulatory authority.
Gas Undertake a study on structural and regulatory reforms in Announce preliminary findings of the study by December 15.
the gas sector, including the establishment of an Announce key elements of proposed structural and regulatory
independent regulatory authority. reforms, including timetable for implementing those reforms,
before proceeding with the privatization of KOGAS.
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, actions related to the first tranche release will have been implemented before presentation of the loan to the Executive Directors and
actions related to the second tranche release will have been implemented before the release of the second tranche.
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KOREA - SAL II Policy Matrix
Labor Market and Social Safety Nets
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Integration of Social Policy Reform Agenda
Improve the framework for the design and Commitment to clearly mandate and adequately Establishment of a Working-Level Committee under the National
coordination of social safety net policies. staff the National Committee on Social Security Comnittee on Social Security, anchored in the Prime Minister's
chaired by the Prime Minister, to coordinate cross- Office and provided with adequate professional staff capacity, to
cutting reforms in social policies in order to serve as a focal point.
achieve coherence across concerned ministries and Complete interim assessment report on cost-effectiveness of
agencies. integrating contributions to social risk management funds for
pensions, medical insurance and unemployment insurance,
including: (a) collection mechanisms; (b) contribution base
determination; and (c) cross-checking features.
Complete interim assessment report on the aggregate payroll tax
and labor market implications of adjustments in coverage and
contribution rates for pensions, medical insurance and
unemployment insurance.
Social Protection for Workers
Expand sustainable coverage of income support Extend Ul to firms with fewer than 5 workers and Adjust contribution rates if necessary in order to maintain
provided by the unemployment insurance (UI) to temporary and part-time workers with effect financial viability of UI scheme for FY99 given anticipated
component of the Employment Insurance Scheme from October 1998. unemployment rate and any changes in benefit structure (per
(EIS). Commitment to maintain actuarial integrity of the SAL I agreement).
UI scheme, i.e. positive financial reserves, and
zero leakage to other programs (per SAL I
agreement).
Tncrease employment by enuhancing labor market Commitment to implement fully the layoff Achievement of progress, satisfactory to the Bank, on
flexibility. | provisions of the 1998 Labor Standards Act so as I enhancement of labor market flexibilityv
to remove undue labor market impediments to
efficient corporate restructuring. Complete report providing recommendations for appropriate
expansion of public employment services without crowding out
private employment services.
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Improve efficiency of active labor market Commitment to limit expenditure on ES and Complete interim evaluation report on the cost-effectiveness of ES
programs by eliminating cost-ineffective programs VAD programs by containing contribution rates and VAD programs (per SAL I agreement).
provided under the employment security (ES) and at or below current levels (0.3% for ES and Hold national workshop with stakeholders to discuss the interim
vocational ability development (VAD) components averaging 0.4% for VAD) and maintaining evaluation report.
of EIS. positive financial reserves. Comnitment not to Disseminate the interim evaluation report.
provide budget subsidies that increase the scope Announce policy adjustments to eliminate ES and VAD programs
of ES and VAD activities beyond self-financed found to be cost-ineffective
operations.
Commnitment not to expand coverage of ES and
VAD programs any further.
Finalize TOR acceptable to the Bank and initiate
formal evaluation of cost-effectiveness of ES and
VAD programs
Protecting the Poor
Expand provision of workfare for the unemployed Implement expanded Phase II of the temporary Allocate adequate FY99 budget to absorb supply of labor
who are not insured. public works program at wage levels designed to forthcoming for public works at targeted wage levels (not higher
target the poor jobless by self-selection. than Phase II in real terms).
Restrict participation to the unemployed who are Relax capacity constraints on workfare expansion by involving
not currently eligible to receive UI benefits. NGO and private sector contractors.
Expand provision of means-tested noncontributory Commitment to expand budget allocation in Allocate adequate FY99 budget.
income support for the poor. FY99 to the temporary noncontributory means-
tested allowance for the unemployed poor in line
with increases in the eligible target group.
Commitment to expand budget allocation in Allocate adequate FY99 budget.
FY99 to workfare and other fomis of income
support for able-bodied beneficiaries of "self-
support" under the livelihood protection program
for the poor.
Maintain real expenditure per eligible beneficiary Initiate analytical report assessing trends in the Complete the two reports by October 30.
on existing livelihood protection programs for the 1998 inflation rate adjusted for consumption Allocate adequate FY99 budget taking into account: (a)
poor (self-support, home care and institutional care patterns of poor households. adjustment of nominal per capita benefits to compensate for
programs). Initiate analytical report assessing 1998 trends in inflation among the poor; and (b) adjustment of total budget to
the number and characteristics of people living in absorb increased number of eligible poor.
poor households.
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Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Strengthen information base for regular poverty Implement special National Survey of Hold national workshop to review design options for a regular
monitoring and analysis. Employment Assistance and Welfare Needs of national multipurpose household survey, including a panel
the Unemployed (KIHASA/KLI/NSO subsample, incorporating comprehensive data on household
collaboration). welfare and coverage of government programs.
Assign institutional responsibility for Complete feasibility report for introducing a regular national
coordinating interagency inputs to design of an multipurpose household survey, including questionnaire design,
integrated multipurpose national household sample size, field operations, policy analysis and institutional
survey. responsibilities.
Financial Risk Management for Health
Improve efficiency of financial intermediation by Complete prospective assessment report on cost- Implement consolidation plan for insurance societies under SEMI.
public sector health insurers through reducing the effectiveness of alternative options for
unit costs of administration per insured under the consolidation of the fragmented insurance
national Medical Insurance System (MIS). societies belonging to Self-Employed Medical
Insurance (SEMI) component of MIS.
Commnitment o incorporate the financial
operations of MIS into the consolidated fiscal
accounting framework of the published
Government Finance Statistics for the public
sector, beginning with FY99 fiscal accounts.
In consultation with the Bank, announce a detailed timetable for
Strengthen supply-side incentives for efficient Comnnitment to implement a universal reform of implementation of the provider payment reform plan beginning
provision of medical care. the provider payment system to improve cost with the year 2000.
containment incentives based on DRG-based
pricing.
Adopt and announce key elements of the coinsurance reform plan,
Improve demand-side protection against major Commnitrnent to significantly reduce by FY2000 both for MIS and Medicaid, including the timetable for
financial risks for MIS beneficiaries and for poor the effective coinsurance rate for hospital implementation beginning with FY2000.
Medicaid beneficiaries by reducing out-of-pocket | inpatient care, combined with an income-related
copayments. catastrophic cap, both for MIS and Medicaid.
Initiate preparation of a coinsurance reform plan,
both for MIS and Medicaid, including
adjustments to special treatment changes,
inclusion of noncovered services, and
reallocation of health insurance coverage from
minor to major risks.
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Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Commitment to harmonize Medicaid provider Commitment to allocate adequate FY2000 budget to implement
reimbursement levels with MIS. provider reimbursement reform for Medicaid beneficiaries.
Implement an official investigation of leakages of Complete investigation report and initiate implementation of its
allocated budget funds from reaching poor recommendations.
beneficiaries of the Medicaid program.
Diversify policy instruments for pooling financial In consultation with the Bank, finalize TORs and Hold public workshop to review findings and recommendations of
risks of medical care. initiate evaluation report on introduction of assessment report on introduction of MSAs.
individual medical savings accounts (MSAs) to
finance intermediate financial risks associated
with medical care.
Social Protection for the Elderly
Mitigate impact of the economic crisis on living Initiate analytical report assessing the Complete the analytical report and allocate adequate FY99 budget
standards of the elderly. effectiveness of the means-tested noncontributory for the social pension to achieve effective coverage of the poor
"social pension" for elderly aged over 65 in terms elderly target group.
of coverage of the target group, and prevention of
poverty among recipients.
Improve transparency and governance of financial Commitment to establish an Office or function of Establish the Office/function of the Actuary.
operations of all public pension schcmes (NPS and the Actuary in the Office of the Prime Minister Allocate adequate FY99 budgct to pTepare and publish the first
occupational schemes for civil servants, teachers responsible for annual projections of the long- annual status report for FY98.
and military). term actuarial status of all public pension
schemes based on consistent mnacroeconomic and
demographic assumptions.
Commitment to incorporate the financial
operations of the Teachers and Civil Servants
pension schemes into the consohdated fiscal
accounting framework of the published
Government Finance Statistics for the public
sector, beginning with FY99 fiscal accounts.
Develop an integrated pension reform proposal Finalize TORs acceptable to the Bank governing Establish the Government Task Force by October 1998 (per SAL I
that fully recognizes and rationalizes the the structure, composition and mandate of the agreement). Commitment to complete draft White Paper no later
mandatory public and private components of the Government Task Force responsible for the than November 1999 (with background papers completed by June
existing pension system. planned comprehensive White Paper on Pension 1999) on an integrated pension reform package combining
Reform (per SAL I agreement). public/private and mandatory/voluntary pensions pillars designed
to attain: (a) a reasonable replacement rate target for the average
worker; (b) reasonable protection from poverty for the aged; and
(c) long-term financial sustainability. Completion of progress
report on the work program of the Task Force.
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Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Achieve more efficient allocation of National Adopt and announce a timetable for Implement the phased reduction of forced government appropriations
Pension Fund (NPF) assets. implementation of the reduction in forced from NPF agreed with the Bank, through adoption of legislation
government appropriation of the flow of satisfactory to the Bank, including necessary revisions to the Public
NPF surpluses (per SAL I agreement) as Fund Management Act.
follows: 65% of the NPF surplus flow in Implement plan to strengthen the professional investment unit in the
1999, 40% in 2000, 20% in 2001 and 0% in National Pension Corporation (per SAL I agreement), including: (a)
2002. achievement of a high standard of staff qualifications and supporting
Announce that the stock of outstanding loans technology; and (b) adequate resources to monitor external fund
to government from NPF will be repaid in managers.
full at maturity without rollovers.
In consultation with the Bank, announce Announce a schedule acceptable to the Bank for contracting out asset
specific guidelines for governance of NPF management and implement plan to increase gradually and
reserves, including: (a) the task of the asset substantially the share of NPS assets outsourced to external fund
management committee; (b) investment rules managers (per SAL I agreement), including: (a) increased unit
and rating procedures; (c) benchmarking and amount outsourced per external fund manager in order to attract
reporting mechanism; and (d) index-based interest of reputable firms; and (b) adoption of revised criteria for
criteria for selecting external fund managers. selecting and recontracting external fund managers to reflcct
diversification of investment risks.
Commitment to: (a) phase out per agreed timetable all lending from
NPF to program participants using their contributions as collateral;
and (b) refrain from providing financial assistance from NPF to
restructuring of financially distressed corporations
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, actions related to the first tranche release will have been implemcnted before presentation of the loan to the Executive Directors and
actions related to the second tranche release will have been implemented before the release of the second tranche.
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ANNEX TO THE SAL II POLICY MATRIX
CONDITIONS FOR BOARD PRESENTATION AND SECOND TRANCHE RELEASE
The full program of policy actions to be supported by SAL II is set out in the SAL II
Policy Matrix. Within this full program, a subset of key policy actions has been identified whose
implementation will be a condition for Board presentation and second tranche release. Besides
these specific policy actions, a general condition will be that the implementation of the full
program is satisfactory overall.
Conditions for Board Presentation
Within the full program detailed in the policy Matrix, the following will serve as
conditions for Board presentation:
e Adoption of objectives and principles acceptable to the Bank to be used by the Government
in making decisions on the implementation plans of the seven undercapitalized banks, and
other banks so identified, including the provision of financial support by the Government.
* Agreement between the Government and the lead manager selected for the privatization of
Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank on the general deal structure (including confirmation to the
Bank of the modalities of provision of public support), and authorization to the lead manager
to contact investors.
* Adoption of principles acceptable to the Bank governing the use of public resources in
financial system rcstructuring and recapitalization.
* Issuance of guidelines to financial institutions by FSC, satisfactory to the Bank, limiting the
extension of "emergency" loans to corporations.
* Commitment to establish an independent accounting standard setting organization by June
1999.
* Adoption and announcement of an overall strategy acceptable to the Bank for dealing with
structural, regulatory and institutional issues in privatization and SOE reform in infrastructure
sectors, including, inter alia, the priority to be given to transition toward more competitive
market structures and establishment of appropriate regulatory structures, and sequencing of
structural, regulatory and ownership reforms.
* Extension of unemployment insurance to firms with fewer than five workers and to
temporary and part-time workers, with effect from October 1998.
* Adoption and announcement of a timetable agreed with the Bank for the reduction of forced
government appropriation of the flow of National Pension Fund surpluses, and
announcement of the Government's commitment that the stock of its outstanding borrowings
from NPF will be repaid in full at maturity without rollovers.
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Conditions for Second Tranche Release
Within the full program detailed in the Policy Matrix, the following will serve as
conditions for release of the second tranche, in addition to the general requirement of overall
satisfactory progress in carrying out the full program.
* Maintenance of a sound macroeconomic framework, consistent with the objectives of the
Program, as determined on the basis of indicators agreed to by the Borrower and the Bank.
* In consultation with the Bank, adoption of process and principles necessary to ensure that
adequate public resources will be made available by the Government for use in financial
system recapitalization and restructuring.
* Achievement of progress, satisfactory to the Bank, toward sale by the Government of
majority ownership in Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank through a biding process satisfactory
to the Bank.
• Adoption by KAMCO of principles, acceptable to the Bank, for the disposition of troubled
assets acquired by KAMCO, including the sale of a majority of assets within three years of
acquisition. Adoption of procedures, sources and instruments of funding for KAMCO
acceptable to the Bank.
* (a) Adoption and issuance by FSC of improved accounting and auditing standards for
financial institutions, listed companies and joint stock companies consistent with international
best practice and prepared with participation of representatives of internationally recognized
accounting firms, and institution and announcement of the requirement that financial
statements of financial institutions, listed companies, and joint stock companies with assets in
excess of W7 billion will be prepared and audited in accordance with these standards from
fiscal year 1999. (b) Adoption and announcement of an implementation plan acceptable to
the Bank for the establishment of an independent accounting standard setting organization by
June 1999.
* Adoption and announcement of a plan and schedule acceptable to the Bank for the institution
of a requirement for the establishment by listed companies of audit committees of boards of
directors, and completion of a draft of necessary changes in laws and regulations to give
effect to this requirement.
* Enactment of amendments to the Fair Trade Act, acceptable to the Bank, to enhance
competition in the domestic economy, based on the recommendations of the Joint
Public,/Private Sector Committee.
* Enactment of the Act on Comprehensive Regulation of Cartels.
* Enactment of legislation, satisfactory to the Bank, modifying restrictions under the Fair Trade
Act on the creation of holding company structures so as to permit such structures subject to
conditions to avoid undue ownership concentration.
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* Achievement of progress, satisfactory to the Bank, on enhancement of labor market
flexibility.
* Allocation of amounts in the 1999 budget sufficient to: (a) expand the public works program
to absorb the supply of labor forthcoming at targeted wage levels (not higher in real terms
than under Phase II of this program); (b) expand the provision of means-tested non-
contributory income support for the unemployed poor in line with the increase in the eligible
target group; (c) expand workfare and other forms of income support for able-bodied
beneficiaries of "self-support" under the livelihood protection program; and (d) at least
maintain in real terms the level of expenditure per beneficiary under the existing livelihood
protection programs for the poor.
* Implementation of the phased reduction of forced government appropriations from the
National Pension Fund agreed with the Bank, through adoption of legislation satisfactory to
the Bank, including necessary revisions to the Public Fund Management Act.
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